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MISSOURI'S MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT
COMPARED WITH MASSACHUSETTS' COMPULSORY
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY SECURITY ACT
In the past two decades there has been considerable agitation
for the enactment of legislation to assure the financial repon-
sibility of operators of motor vehicles. The reason lies primarily
in the fact that the number of automobiles (particularly the
number of automobiles of little value) has increased many fold
as have the number of injuries inflicted as a result of negligent
operation by persons financially incapable of responding in
damages. As a result state legislatures have enacted laws which,
in general, have attempted in one of two manners to assure
financial responsibility. The first and most prevalent type of
statute is that found in Missouri; the other is like the Massa-
chusetts Act.
THE MIsSOuRI ACT'
Four years ago Missouri passed the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act which became effective thirty days after July
8, 1946, and which provided in part that:
The Commissioner also shall suspend the license and all
registration certificates or cards and registration plates
issued to any person upon receiving authenticated report,
as hereinafter provided, that such person has failed for a
period of thirty days to satisfy any final judgment in
amounts and upon a cause of action, as hereinafter stated. 2
The Act further provides that:
Every judgment herein referred to shall for the purposes
of this Act be deemed satisfied: 1. When $5,000 has been
credited upon any judgment or judgments rendered in ex-
cess of that amount for bodily injury to or the death of one
person as the result of any one accident; or 2. When sub-
ject to the said limit of $5,000 as to one person, the sum of
$10,000 has been credited upon any judgment or judgments
rendered in excess of that amount for bodily injury to or
the death of more than one person as the result of any one
accident; or 3. When $1,000 has been credited upon anyjudgment or judgments rendered in excess of that amount
for damage to property of others as a result of any one
accident3
1. Mo. R v. STAT. § 303.01--303.29 (1949).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. §303.03 (1949).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.05 (1949).
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Under the Missouri act once a judgment is obtained and
remains unsatisfied for the aforementioned thirty day period to
the extent specified above and the judgment debtor's license and
auto registration is suspended, he is under the duty of return-
ing such license and such evidence of registration as he may
possess subject to being deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The
suspension will remain in effect and no other vehicle will be
registered in the name of such judgment debtor, nor will any
new license be issued to such person for the vehicles involved,
unless and until such judgment is satisfied or stayed and the
judgment debtor gives proof of financial responsibility. A
discharge in bankruptcy will not relieve the judgment debtor
from any of the requirements of the act.
Proof of financial responsibility in the future means proof of
the ability to respond in damages for any liability thereafter
incurred resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use, or
operation of the motor vehicle involved in any one accident
causing bodily injury to or death of any one person in the
amount of $5,000; causing bodily injury to or death of two or
more persons in any one accident in the amount of $10,000; and
for damage to property in the amount of $1,000 resulting from
any one accident. Proof of ability to respond in damages to this
extent may be made in any one of three ways; by proof of a
policy of liability insurance to cover the above risks, by the
deposit with the appropriate official of money or securities to
the extent necessary to cover the above risks, or by the execu-
tion of a bond sufficient to cover the above risks.
The act applies to non-residents and provides for suspension
of their driving privileges in Missouri. It also applies to one
who drives another's vehicle which vehicle is not insured to cover
the non-owning driver. For violation in the latter case, the oper-
ator's chauffeur's license will be incumbered. 4
THE MASSACHUSETTS ACT5
At an early date in the history of this type of legislation, 1925,
the General Court of Massachusetts passed what, even today, is
a progressive enactment in this field. The Massachusetts act
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.08 (1949). Any person whose license or regis-
tration has been suspended must return same to director of revenue or be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
5. 3 MASS. LAWS ANN., c. 90, § 34 (1946).
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provides that no motor vehicle can be registered unless the appli-
cation for such registration is accompanied by a certificate as
subsequently defined in the act.
Definitions. The following words as used in sections 34A
to 34J inclusive shall have the following meanings: "Cer-
tificate," the certificate of an insurance company authorized
to issue in the commonwealth a motor vehicle liability policy,
stating that it has issued to the applicant for registration
of a motor vehicle such a policy which covers such motor
vehicle, and conforms to the provisions of section 113A of
Chapter 175 and runs for a period at least coterminous
with that of such registration or that it has executed a
binder, as defined in section 113A under and in conformity
with said section covering such motor vehicle pending the
issue of a motor vehicle liability policy; or the certificate
of a surety company authorized to transact business in the
commonwealth under section 105 of said Chapter 175 as
surety, stating that a motor vehicle liability bond payable
to the commonwealth which covers such motor vehicle, and
conforms to the provisions of said section 113A, and runs
for a period at least coterminous with such registration, has,
been executed by such applicant as principal and by such
surety company; or the certificate of the department stat-
ing that cash or securities have been deposited with the
department as provided in section 34D.6
The sanction is that whoever operates a motor vehicle which
is subject to the provisions of the act and which is not insured
against liability shall be subject to a fine of not less than $100
and not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than
one year.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Little doubt remains as to the constitutional basis of either
the Missouri or Massachusetts type of statute. The validity of
these statutes is based on the grounds that the use of the high-
ways is a privilege granted by the state, that such privilege
may be conditioned by the state in any reasonable manner, and
that the imposition of a requirement of financial responsibility
upon those who make use of the highways is a reasonable con-
dition.
A serious constitutional objection arises, however, from the
provision in the Missouri type statute that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy will not relieve the judgment debtor from the suspension
6. 3 MAss. LAws ANN., c. 90, § 34A (1946).
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provisions of the act. The argument advanced is that the provi-
sion is in conflict with the bankruptcy laws of the United States
and, therefore, must give way to them.
The first case to raise this point was In re Perkins,7 a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, in which the court held that section 94 (b)
of New York's Vehicle & Traffic Code, which provides that one's
driver's license and motor vehicle registration shall remain sus-
pended until any judgment, as previously defined in the act, is
satisfied or discharged except by discharge in bankruptcy, was
in conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The court noted
that the section here in question does not interfere with the
supremacy of the bankruptcy court in the administration of the
property of the bankrupt, but rather the alleged conflict arises
from the fact that the section denies to the bankrupt the full
effect upon such judgment of the discharge in bankruptcy.
The question arose again in Munz v. Harnett, Commissioner
of Motor Vehicle Bureau,8 in which, by a unanimous decision,
a special three man statutory court upheld the validity of the
New York Act as against a contention that it was in conflict
with the Bankruptcy Act. The court stated that a discharge in
bankruptcy is not a satisfaction of the judgment, but rather
serves only as a bar to collection of the judgment; and since the
act does not give any additional remedy with which to satisfy
the judgment, it is not in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. In
answer to the contention that, practically speaking, an additional
remedy was given, the court points out that although the provi-
sion here in question will result in a greater likelihood that the
judgment creditor will be paid even after the judgment debtor
has gone through bankruptcy, this effect is merely collateral to
the cardinal purpose of the statute which is, of course, to insure
competence and care on the part of one using the highway by
means of reasonable police regulation.
The third case to consider the validity of the New York law
was Reitz v. Mealey, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,9 in which
a three man Federal Court, speaking through Judge Learned
Hand, stated that although the power to suspend one's driver's
license is in effect a means of aiding in the collection of the
7. 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. N.Y. 1933).
8. 6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. N.Y. 1938).
9. 34 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. N.Y. 1940).
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judgment debt, and if the Bankruptcy Act is to be read as reliev-
ing bankrupts of all sanctions for the collection of dischargeable
debts, no matter what other public purpose they may serve, then
the act here in question is invalid because it conflicts with the
Bankruptcy Act and the latter controls. But the court went on
to say that the Bankruptcy Act should not be so read. A state
should not be so impeded in its legislative policy. If the sanction
imposed is designed to promote some equally valid public pur-
pose, it should not be struck down as being in conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act. The court states that the inability to pay one's
debts is not irrelevant in determining one's fitness for many
kinds of activity.
Judge Cooper, dissenting, reiterated his position, taken in the
previous case of In re Perkins,lo that there is a conflict between
the Bankruptcy Act and the provisions of the New York statute
which causes those provisions to fail; and since they are in-
separable the whole act fails. Judge Cooper also based his posi-
tion on the fact that it is completely within the discretion of thejudgment creditor as to whether the license shall be revoked
since it is he who must request certification of the judgment to
the commissioner and since he can, on written request, have the
suspension lifted. He pointed out that in that way control over
the sanction is placed in the hands of the judgment creditor as
a weapon to force payment of the judgment debt after discharge
in bankruptcy.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,1" the case was
affirmed by a five-to-four decision. The majority held that the
provision, that a discharge in bankruptcy should not discharge
the judgment within the meaning of this act, was not put into
the act to protect the rights of the judgment creditor, but rather
to enforce the state's public policy that financially irresponsible
persons should not use the highways. This policy would be frus-
trated if one were allowed to satisfy the provisions of the act
by obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy.
With respect to the provision that a judgment creditor must
request a certification to the commissioner of the outstanding
judgment, a counterpart of which does not exist in the Missouri
act and which provision is an amendment to the original New
10. 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. N.Y. 1933).
11. Reitz v. Mealey, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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York act, the Court said that this was a mere administrative
convenience to aid the clerk of the court, and even if it were
set aside, the previous provision making it mandatory for the
clerk to certify to the commissioner each judgment which re-
mains unsatisfied for the specified period would come back into
force and the same result would be reached.12
The dissent, however, maintained that the assumption by the
majority does not necessarily follow in that it is merely con-
jectural as to whether the commissioner would suspend the
license after being advised that the amendment giving the
creditor that power contravened the Bankruptcy Act. Also,
even assuming that there would be a replacement by the old
provision if the amendment dropped out, the provision that if
the creditor consents in writing to lift the suspension, such sus-
pension will be lifted, still remains and renders the act invalid.
The majority found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of
this latter provision in that it was not invoked in the present
case. "If the creditor attempts to exercise that power the com-
missioner will have to determine whether the amendment giving
the creditor such power is valid."' 3
The dissent also argues that a state cannot supply a device
for the collection of debts which survives a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. It goes on to say that a collection device is preserved
by the act in that if the judgment is not paid, the judgment
creditor will see to it that the license is suspended, but if it is
paid, there will be no such suspension. Thus the bankrupt, in-
stead of receiving by virtue of his discharge "a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt," finds him-
12. The majority then stated that the provision permitting the judgment
creditor to lift the suspension on written request was not invoked here
and therefore is not material to this case. The Missouri act does not pro-
vide that the judgment creditor may have the suspension lifted or in
any way prevent the suspension, but it does provide for installment settle-
ments made under the supervision of the court during which time the
license and registration of the judgment debtor will be restored upon proof
of financial responsibility to the named extent. Lastly the Court said that
if the provisions here in question were held invalid, they are severable and
the whole act should not fail.
13. The minority of the court felt that it was necessary to decide on
the validity of these provisions in that if they were held to be unconstitu-
tional the whole statute would fail while the majority felt that even
if one or more of these amendments were held to be unconstitutional they
would merely drop out and the original act would be retained.
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self still entangled with a former creditor. In short the dissent
maintained that the judgment creditor is given a powerful col-
lection device which should not be allowed to survive bankruptcy.
The courts have thus in the main taken two points of view. The
first view is represented by the opinions of Judge Cooper that the
law denies to the bankrupt the full effect of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy and, therefore, is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and
consequently must give way to it. In the second view of the
question, which was the view taken by Judge Learned Hand and
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, it is admitted that
the bankrupt is denied the full effect of the discharge in bank-
ruptcy but it is further argued that this fact alone does not
render the statute invalid because the Bankruptcy Act should
not be read as relieving bankrupts of all sanctions for the collec-
tion of dischargeable debts no matter what other public policy
may be served, and the provision here in question is aimed at a
public purpose equally as important as the public purpose at
which the Bankruptcy Act is aimed.
Before passage of the Massachusetts Law it was held to be
constitutional in an advisory opinion4 of the Supreme Judicial
Court of that state in which the court cited statistics for the
year 1923 which pointed up the need for legislation to assure the
financial responsibility of operators of motor vehicles.", After
showing the need for such legislation the court went on to say
that the general principle which sustains the validity of the com-
pulsory security provisions of the act is that when, in the opin-
ion of the legislature, the general welfare of the travelers of the
highway is threatened by and demands protection against a
specific evil, any rational means adapted to remedy the evil are
constitutional, and the requirement that every owner, before
being allowed to register his motor vehicle, provide security for
the discharge of possible liability for personal injuries or death
or property damage resulting from the operation of a motor
14. In re Opinion of Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925).
15. They said that in that year there were 20,000 deaths or injuriesfrom motor vehicle accidents 550 of which were fatal accidents causing578 deaths. The blame for two-thirds of these accidents, according to the
court, was on the operator of the motor vehicle in question. Thirty per-
cent of the operators of motor vehicles at that time carried insurance
while the other seventy percent did not, and the financial responsibility ofthe latter group was doubtful, a large percentage of the judgments having
not been satisfied.
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vehicle on the public highways, cannot be pronounced unreason-
able. There is no greater extension of the legislative power here
than in the case of compulsory Workman's Compensation Insur-
ance. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Two TYPES
The question remains as to the effectiveness of the two types of
statutes in correcting, or at least alleviating, the conditions at
which they are aimed. The Missouri statute takes no steps to
assure financial responsibility until after an accident has oc-
curred, a judgment rendered, and there has been a failure to
satisfy the judgment. It is true that there is the potential threat
of having one's license and registration suspended if one is
financially irresponsible and if one has a judgment rendered
against him for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. That
threat undoubtedly causes many conscientious citizens to take out
insurance. But certainly this threat does not assure the financial
responsibility of the public as a whole, many of whom are not
conscientious citizens, as well as does the requirement that one
must give proof of financial responsibility before one's motor
vehicle will be registered. The individual who is really irrespon-
sible, both financially and otherwise, who drives one of the many
"wrecks" which provide our highways with their biggest men-
ace, will not be prevented from operating his motor vehicle by
the mere threat of suspension of his driver's license and auto reg-
istration as a result of his inability to satisfy a judgment which
might be rendered against him. As a matter of fact a person
injured by a financially irresponsible person is not likely to pros-
ecute his claim against the person to the judgment stage for the
simple reason that the defendant is "judgment-proof." The end
result in this event would be that the irresponsible operator is
not even punished for his irresponsibility to the extent of sus-
pension of his license and registration. On the other hand the
Massachusetts statute is not dependent on whether a private
individual prosecutes to judgment a claim for damages as a re-
sult of a tort; for as we have previously seen, the act provides
that whoever operates a motor vehicle in violation of the provi-
sions of that act is subject to a fine or imprisonment. Not only
does the Massachusetts enactment provide a more effective
means of imposing punishment, but the degree of punishment is,
itself more in accordance with the gravity of the offense com-
mitted. CHESTER A. LOVE, JR.
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